Saving Bonds?

The logical train follows a reasonable enough track. The Giants, desperate for free agent reinforcements in what is likely to be Barry Bonds’s last season, had about $18 million left in their budget for 2007. Meanwhile, a host of teams were scrambling to sign the top remaining free agent- one of the best in the class as a whole-, offering somewhere in the vicinity of $15-16 million in average annual value. Since the Giants have little incentive to plan for anything beyond 2007, with GM Brian Sabean at the end of his contract, and Barry Bonds at the end of the road, San Francisco took the plunge on Barry Zito, trying to seize a somewhat depressed NL West in a last gasp before owner Peter McGowan pulls the plug.

Like I said, the plan makes enough sense, especially since Sabean long ago decided to mortgage the entire franchise’s future on the last productive years of Bonds’s career. With no cheap help or big-time trade bait coming down the pipeline, the team had the option of settling for the second division or spending big enough in the free agent market for one Promethean grasp at the postseason. Not to mix mythologies, but the problem with the Giants’ strategy may be that it is more Sisuphysian than Promethean, that the Giants face such an uphill battle that nobody on this year’s free agent market was going to make up the difference.

Before getting into San Fran’s roster movement, consider the ultimate goal: to win the NL West and make it into the postseason sweepstakes. Last year, 88 wins took the division, a two-way tie between San Diego and Los Angeles. In terms of run differential, the Padres finished behind the Dodgers’ Pythagorean record of 88-74 by two projected wins, putting the Dodgers in the best theoretical position going forward. With an aging lineup and the loss of J.D. Drew- replaced by the nearly useless Juan Pierre- the Dodgers project to no more than last year’s 88 wins. With San Diego making improvements in their rotation and their offensive balance, I see them as the top returning candidate in the division, projecting to about 90 wins. Arizona’s youngsters growing into maturity should put them on the same plane; suffice to say the bar for the division will be set somewhere in the neighborhood of 90-72, and the Giants have to make a 14 win improvement in both their actual and Pythagorean records to challenge.

Last year, the Giants got decent contributions from a few positions, but had deadweight at far too many lineup spots. Bonds, Ray Durham, Omar Vizquel, and Moises Alou all made positive contributions, but Randy Winn manned various OF positions at replacement level, and Mark Sweeney, Kevin Frandsen, Mike Matheny, Shea Hillenbrand, Lance Niekro, Jose Vizcaino, and Pedro Feliz all pulled down the lineup more than the theoretical quadruple-A player who is readily available to fill those holes. A team with that many wasted positions is going to have a difficult time making much traction toward the playoffs no matter how good the rest of the team is. The pitching was quite solid, with Jason Schmidt as a legitimate number one, Matt Cain as a solid number two, and Noah Lowry, Brad Hennessey, Matt Morris, and Jamey Wright were all better than bad, giving them more rotational depth than most other teams.

Some may say that the Giants’ task has to be reducing the dreg from five or six offensive positions, and that strategy is one feasible approach, but the real formula boils down to nothing more than runs scored and runs allowed, and any progress on either front will get them closer to the playoffs. It may be easier to gain twenty runs- about 2 wins- over a third baseman who cost the team 8 runs last year than to gain the same amount in run prevention over a fifth starter who was better than league average, but if pitchers are more readily available, then a signing on that front could do more for the team. Altogether, the team made a handful of marginal transactions that give them other options at all of those disastrous failed positions. The big move, though, bolsters the rotation, where the team has to find a way to replace the underrated Jason Schmidt.

The question at hand becomes whether the team as a whole has improved enough to go from a true 76 win team to at least an 86 win team to get themselves into contention by the end of the year. After scoring 746 runs last year, I think the Giants can cross the plate a few more times in 2007. Last year was a great year for Ray Durham and a terrible year for Randy Winn, and the two will converge to some degree in 2007, combining for about 50 runs above replacement just as they did the last year. Trevor Linden and Dave Roberts, though not stars, should combine to approximate the 27 runs and 4 wins they got out of Moises Alou last year, at least when projecting generously. In the infield, the combination of Pedro Feliz, Rich Aurilia, and Ryan Klesko should make some improvement over Mark Sweeney, Shea Hillenbrand, and Pedro Feliz. The inclusion of Feliz on both lists shows a continued problem of getting on base and getting as many plate appearances as possible for Barry Bonds, but Hillenbrand and Sweeney were so unfortunately awful last year that the team is bound for a 20-30 run improvement on that side of the ledger. At catcher, where the Giants made something of a splash by nabbing Ben Molina from Toronto, San Fran is merely treading water. Molina and Eliezer Alfonzo were both worth 3.3 wins above replacement level last year, an imperfect measure, but one that paints a pretty obvious picture of where the team is headed. Getting Mike Matheny out of the lineup is a positive, though spending money on Ben Molina will cost them enough in the field that the swap will make little progress toward victories. Still, if the lineup stays mostly healthy, the Giants have enough depth that 800 runs is not out of the question, and I would expect about 785.

Looking at the offense skirts the real issue: does Barry Zito make the team a contender? Last year, Zito pitched in a pretty good pitcher’s park and in front of a very good defense, accumulating 49 runs above replacement level. This year, in front of an average defense and in a great pitcher’s park, Zito should approximate his previous level of performance. A declining strikeout rate is a cause for concern, just as it predicted the failure of Zito’s former mate Mark Mulder in St. Louis. Nonetheless, Zito profiles to be a pretty consistent starter who, if not an elite starter, verges on the relatively small group of the best pitchers in the game. The under-hyped flipside of the Zito acquisition is the fact that the Giants lost another pitcher this off-season who belongs to that same elite club as Zito, Jason Schmidt. Although less durable, Schmidt’s strong strikeout rate indicates continued success heading forward. If the Giants really wanted to overspend for a pitcher who will help them win now, they had one on the roster who had a nearly identical value to Zito last year. Adding Zito to a rotation that already included Schmidt would give the Giants an outstanding rotation. As it stands, they have an above-average rotation that could see improvements from Matt Cain and Jonathan Sanchez, and should get pretty consistent and predictable performances out of Lowry and Morris. Without big changes to the bullpen, I think they Giants will once again allow about the same number of runs, about 780 instead of 790 due to some small improvements from the younger pitchers in the rotation.

Finally, even though the Giants do not have as high of a ceiling as the Mets or Rangers, the Giants did not have to pay $50 million more than either of them to get Zito. Staying in the same metro area has to count for something, and more importantly, if the Giants were the only team willing to got to $19 million a year, they should not have had to be the only team to go to seven years, as well. I do not know the specifics of all of the other offers, but I have trouble believing that a six year deal with the same average value would not have got the contract done.

All told, that leaves the Giants somewhere between 80 and 82 wins, not a bad team, and not a contender. With a few lucky breaks, they could stay in the race up until the trade deadline, when they could acquire a better third base option or some upgrades in the bullpen. On the other hand, this team is old and brittle, and could very easily lose one or two interesting players for extended periods of time. In that case, or even with some bad luck in translating runs into victories, the season could go downhill in a hurry. Since the Giants have reached their payroll limit already, I hesitate to endorse a signing that has a small chance of letting the team compete for one season before becoming an obvious boondoggle immediately afterward. In other words, if a team is trying to win now at the expense of the future, they better project to better than a .500 record, which is the best I can see for the Giants.

Inactive Lifestyle

In a frenetic off-season distinguished by escalating salaries and rapid player movement, some teams have panicked, overpaying for whatever they can find on the market for fear of entering the season empty handed. It is the same psychological response as a fantasy baseball owner picking a closer or a catcher three rounds too early because someone else started a run. The groupthink mentality exhibits fear more than it does careful planning, and deals made in reaction to the rest of the market seldom turn out to be valuable bargains. More often than not, regrettable deals come out of these circumstances, such as the Yankees scrambling to sign Jaret Wright and Carl Pavano two years ago after the starting pitching market thinned considerably. In this regard, I remain skeptical about spending $70 million on J.D. Drew, or nearly $50 million on Kei Igawa, because both teams rushed to fill holes with sub-optimal solutions whose primary virtues were availability.

On the other hand, a few teams have stayed out of the fray, resisting long-term mistakes for short-term gratification. These teams are not necessarily set at every position, but their front offices have shown enough discipline to avoid making moves that could cripple the team down the road, instead waiting to find a solution that actually fits into the larger plan. Sure, there is an impulse to “win now” present in every franchise and fan base, and knowingly putting a team on the field that is not as competitive as it could be seems like heresy. Nonetheless, teams should shoot for championships, not just one nor two more wins to sneak above .500. Waiting for the right fit at the right time can be more gratifying for teams and for fans. And if you think spending sprees always make the team better, try asking Yankee fans how the feel about those Pavano and Wright deals I mentioned earlier.

Since markets fluctuate in cycles, buying big in a major inflationary season only makes sense if the team has tremendous resources and projects to the cusp of championship contention. Increasing payroll by adding quality players at positions of need could make sense in Boston or New York, since those teams can swallow regrettable contracts more easily than, say, Kansas City, and both teams remain quite close to championship caliber. On the other hand, a few teams have been noticeably absent from the fray this off-season, sitting back and waiting for the market to come to them. Today, I will highlight the virtues of patience in three smart front offices.

Minnesota Twins- Here’s the breakdown of the Twins off-season activity: signed Jeff Cirillo, announced Brad Radke’s retirement. Losing Radke will have an impact on the team, but Terry Ryan knows that going with a combination Matt Garza, Boof Bonser, Scott Baker, Glen Perkins, and Kevin Slowey after Johan Santana makes more economic sense than shelling out $50 million for 5 years of a marginal upgrade on one of those players. It is not as if the team is without holes; no team wants to enter the season with so much rotational uncertainty, and both Lew Ford and Nick Punto remain at the top of the depth chart at their respective positions. Players like Jason Jennings and Gary Matthews would certainly make the Twins better in 2007, but shelling out prospects and cash would hamstring the team in its ability to stay competitive for several years after it. Saving enough money to retain Mauer, Santana, and Morneau makes far more sense for the franchise’s competitive viability and marketability. If Terry Ryan’s restraint in this year’s inflationary market allows the team to keep 2-3 of those marquee names through their primes, it would be well worth the cost of a couple of wins this season. If the team remains competitive through July and has to fill a hole at SP or LF, they can try to address the need then in hopes that the market insanity has settled down a bit.

Team	Added (trade)	Lost (trade)	Added (FA)	Lost (FA)
Minnesota	None	None	Jeff Cirillo	Shannon Stewart Rondell White Brad Radke Phil Nevin
Chicago WS	Andrew Sisco Gavin Floyd David Aardsma	Ross Gload Freddy Garcia Neil Cotts	Toby Hall	Sandy Alomar Dustin Hermanson David Riske
Arizona	Dana Eveland Doug Davis Dave Krynzel	Johnny Estrada Claudio Vargas Greg Aquino	None	Miguel Batista Craig Counsell Damion Easley Luis Gonzalez

Chicago White Sox- One factor making the Twins’ passiveness more palatable is the fact that their divisional rivals have remained relatively quiet as well. Detroit added an impact bat in Gary Sheffield, but that move may just keep them above water, as the starting rotation figures to regress somewhat in 2007, just like Chicago’s did in 2006. That same reasoning must have crossed Kenny Williams’s mind in making his forward-thinking trade of Freddy Garcia to Philadelphia. Among the Sox 2006 starters, Garcia was the second oldest and probably the least likely to have a dominant 2007, considering the miles on his odometer and his diminishing strikeout rate. Garcia will still improve the Philadelphia rotation next year, but the pre-arb contracts that Williams got back for Pat Gillick have become much more valuable with free agent contracts skyrocketing. Additionally, the Sox passed up the opportunity to spend big money on an upgrade of either Scott Podsednik or Brian Anderson in the outfield, keeping their options open and their costs down in case they find a more cost-efficient solution down the road. Meanwhile, Williams has made little moves, such as improving the backup catching fiasco from last year by adding Toby Hall, and grabbing live arms like Andrew Sisco and David Aardsma to increase the bullpen’s upside. Like the Twins, the Sox have avoided making decisions that they will regret two or three years from now, sticking with certainty and allowing themselves an opportunity to continue improving.

Arizona Diamondbacks- Unlike Minnesota and Chicago, Arizona’s offseason additions and losses make quite a long list. They made a trade with Milwaukee that returned two potential starters in Dana Eveland and Doug Davis. They also waved good-bye to the remnants of the pre-Josh Byrnes era strategy of surplus veterans. Watching Miguel Batista, Craig Counsell, and Luis Gonzalez leave town made the team significantly younger, but more importantly freed up playing time for their army of young studs. The D-Backs wisely sat back while their roster turned over, leaving Chris Young, Carlos Quentin, Conor Jackson, Stephen Drew, Chad Tracy, and Chris Snyder as full time starters. With Justin Upton still in the pipeline, the D-Backs have a tremendous future ahead of them, and it makes eminently more sense to find out just how good this team can be while saving some resources for upgrades later down the road. It is entirely possible that Arizona will challenge Los Angeles for the NL West title this season with this roster, but if they do not, they have enough roster and payroll flexibility to make the minor moves next year that could push them over the top. So even though they have seen more players come and go than either Chicago or Minnesota, the D-Backs have similarly kept their options open for a time when salary inflation is less rampant and their own roster is more certain.

Rich and Creamy Center

Assessing the Value of Up-the-Middle Positions

Baseball performance analysis has come a long way in terms of understanding positional value. Remember, back in the day, when lumbering first basemen like Ryan Howard and Justin Morneau would win MVP awards over their nimble and athletic competitors, like Joe Mauer, Derek Jeter, or Carlos Beltran? Remember when David Ortiz was widely regarded as his league’s best player, even though his concrete appendages locked him into the DH role, and consequently, Manny Ramirez into a defensive position other than the bench? Those were the good old days, a veritable age of blissful ignorance, when nobody worried about the effect that a player’s defensive value had on the rest of the team. I will keep a place open in my heart for those days, way back in… this year.

Factually, up-the-middle position players can have a lot more value than their corner counterparts for a few reasons, largely relating to versatility for the individual and for the team. Nonetheless, sportswriters and common fans seem to miss the boat on positional value, seeing 40 homeruns as 40 homeruns, for instance, rather than putting it in the context of what that player does across the board. Looking at the most successful teams in the Major Leagues, it is no surprise that the best up-the-middle players populate the rosters of the teams in the postseason. Still, players like Carlos Lee, whose lack of versatility leaves him with nowhere to go but down over the life of his six year deal, receive abundant accolades. Non-fans often point out that baseball players do not deserve consideration as elite athletes, because they can show up to work fat and lazy. Up-the-middle players shatter this aesthetic stereotype, and it is no coincidence that they are baseball’s cream of the crop across the board, piling up wins and aging well.

Obviously, different positions on the field are more difficult than others, but talent at any position other than catcher draws from the same basic set of skills. Bill James’s well-known defensive spectrum ranks each position from hardest to easiest, from SS-2B-CF-3B-RF-LF-1B. If one includes catcher, it goes at the very beginning of the spectrum, because it is more difficult, while requiring different talents than other positions. In almost every case, a player will have more success moving down the defensive spectrum in a position shift than moving up it. Minor leaguers routinely start out as middle infielders, especially since they played premium positions in high school or college when the positions were less demanding, then shift as they approach the majors to a position where their bats will still play and their gloves can survive at the Major League level. Similarly, as players age, they often move down the spectrum as their skills slowly erode, like Craig Biggio moving off of 2B and into the OF. Occasionally, a player like Alfonso Soriano will switch positions in his prime due to a team’s positional need- Jose Vidro blocked Soriano at second when he joined the Nationals- and can change again later, as Soriano may move back up the spectrum to CF this year in Chicago. The justification for the defensive spectrum comes from a general sense of athleticism and coordination. Successful defense starts with sound fundamentals, and those skills play at any position. Furthermore, great athleticism allows players to make up for or expand upon fundamentals at any position, so there is no magic in understanding what makes a player strong defensively

As such, playing an up-the-middle position gives the team more versatility with its roster. One of Craig Biggio’s great virtues is that he has been able to fit into Houston’s roster holes throughout his career. After the 1991 season, it was abundantly clear that Casey Candele was not a championship-caliber second baseman and was not about to become one. At the same time, Eddie Taubensee, a 23-year old catcher at the time, appeared ready to contribute at the major league level. Biggio’s versatility allowed the team to upgrade at second base without having a great second base prospect in the system. In a positive sense, an individual player’s versatility means that prospects or bargain acquisitions will never face the obstacle of positional crowding because the manager can find some way to put its best roster on the field.

Bill Hall of the Milwaukee Brewers is another prime example of the benefits of roster flexibility. Entering last year as a backup, Hall was good right-handed bat who had enough of a glove to play any position besides catcher. Accounting for the requisite backup catcher and lefty fourth outfielder, the Brewers had their bases covered with an 11-man offensive roster. If the team chose to carry 12 pitchers, they would be left with 2 roster spots for specialization, such as an extreme lefty masher to pinch hit a couple of times per week, a submarining LOOGY who has limited applicability, but is very good at his job, a burner who can pinch run late in games, or a handful of other luxuries that most other teams cannot afford to carry. As it worked out, Hall spent most of the season filling in for injured SS J.J. Hardy and hitting enough that the front office thinks that his bat will survive in LF this year, replacing the departed Carlos Lee and saving the team a ton of money. With lots of mediocre options on the OF corners, Hall can also back up the infielders, creating a sort of pseudo-platoon that maximizes his value, frees up other roster spots, and allows the team to get its best match-ups on the field every day. A natural right-fielder does not provide the team that luxury of flexibility, making versatile, up-the-middle types that much more valuable.

Additionally, the defensive value of these positions is paramount. More balls are hit to players in these positions, they have to cover more ground to make these plays, and good defenders up the middle can compensate for shortcomings elsewhere on the field. The Baseball Prospectus fielding metrics do not use play-by-play data, so they may be unreliable for individual players, but they give a fair representation of the difference between average and replacement level for the entire league. For instance, Derek Jeter was seven runs better than the average Major League SS last year, but thirty runs better than the replacement level SS. In other words, the difference between putting the average SS on the field and a readily available quad-A non-SS would be 23 runs, or more than two full wins at the single position. Here’s a breakdown of the difference between average and replacement level at each position, showing how much more valuable an up-the-middle player is than a corner defender with an identical bat:

Position	Average Runs Above Replacement
C	22
SS	23
2B	15
CF	16
3B	15
RF	12
LF	9
1B	9

Although these numbers are more aggregate approximations than scientific fact, they give a good outline of how much more valuable the same player can be if he can be an average shortstop or centerfielder than an average first baseman or left fielder. One and a half wins out of one player is pretty substantial, but the difference grows when you consider that there are four such positions. There is a good reason for why punting defense does not work- just getting a set of average defenders can make a difference of five or six wins pretty quickly, with escalators for above average gloves across the diamond.

So even though many sportswriters seem to miss the boat on the value of up-the-middle players, it should not be hard to see the advantages that these players have over their corner counterparts. In addition to the versatility that they provide for the team- improving options for match-ups- and for themselves- staying in the lineup as is necessary for the team-, they also provide more wins by simply playing average defense with the same bat. Acquiring talented players up the middle is not an absolute panacea for roster management, but it makes the rest of the package much easier to compile. So maybe it is time we stopped living in 2006, and turned over a new page to see the difference between Carlos Beltran and Ryan Howard.

Long is the New Short- A Tale of Free Agent Madness

Of all of the perplexing developments in the first phase of Major League Baseball free agency, one jumps off the page to me more than the others. Jim Hendry’s 8-year pact with the 30 year-old Alfonso Soriano stands out as a bastion of lengthiness in a sport where many executives aim at keeping contracts short and risks low. Six years of Carlos Lee and four years of Juan Pierre reinforce the idea that GMs across the league have become more accepting of the long-term deal. Remember, just two short off-seasons ago, the fate of the World Champion Boston Red Sox turned on the idea of contract length and risk minimization; Pedro Martinez walked not over dollar amounts, but getting an extra guaranteed year. Jason Varitek shared the same hang-up in his negotiations, and Johnny Damon ran into a similar issue before bolting for the Bronx. Analysts extolled Theo Epstein and company for keeping their commitments to expensive players to a reasonable length, and discretion has proven the better part of valor, as both Pedro and Varitek face uncertain futures for 2007 and beyond. Now, even the Red Sox are trying to squeeze extra years out of Daisuke Matsuzaka, beyond what Scott Boras wants to secure.

While the Sox’ desire for mucho Matsuzaka goes back to getting the most out of their astronomical posting fee, something is clearly in the air when in comes to the length of contracts dolled out this year. Not since the exorbitant winter of 2000 have players signed on for so much, and especially for so long, and I’m not willing to concede that the Islanders’ Rick DiPietro contract liberated several of MLB’s GMs. I believe the change comes from two factors converging at the right time. First, with all of the money floating around from the new CBA and MLB Advanced Media, more than a few franchises are willing to hand out wads of cash to get the guys they want. To set themselves apart, teams like the Cubs and Astros chose to stretch out the length rather than the yearly dollar value. Second, GMs see this year’s contract inflation and the increasing reasonableness of the Manny Ramirez/Derek Jeter/Alex Rodriguez monster deals and start to think that the yearly value of these contracts will not look so bad as salaries continue to escalate. In other words, “$17 million in 2014” sounds like a lot, but in 2014, maybe $17 million will not sound like so much.

As far as the validity of these two assumptions goes, I think the first is far more passable than the second. Obviously, if a team wants to set its offer apart from the crowd, that team can increase the money or the years- no magic or karma enters into the equation. The second part of the calculation is substantially more dubious. Obviously, inflation has an effect on any contract, but Hendry and company seem to think that inflation will continue at this year’s crazy pace. If the average yearly salary of new free agents goes up 50 or 60 percent every off-season, the Soriano will look like a bargain in the middle of his deal. In reality, salary inflation always occurs to some degree- even in times of collusion- though to varying and cyclical degrees. Typically, salaries will inflate heavily for a season or two, then cycle back down as teams find that they have invested a huge chunk of change in a few players over a couple of years.

Again, consider the Red Sox over the last several years. The big contracts to Nomar, Manny, Pedro, and others under the Duquette regime forced Epstein’s group to be a little more judicious with their spending patterns when they took over the team. Hence, instead of signing a big time free agent to play first base or DH, they took their chances on washouts, minor league free agents, and rejects, winning big on David Ortiz and Kevin Millar while cutting their losses on the Jeremy Giambis of the world. The Red Sox show that big salaries or long contracts are not the only ways to land big talent. More crucially, the Red Sox show how an individual team can only spend like it’s their bachelor party for so long before the tab comes due and they have to rein in the GM’s allowance.

Since teams bid against each other for free agents, salaries tend to escalate for several teams at the same time, usually when financial conditions in the league are fortuitous. Consequently, inflation tends to subside at the same time, as all of these teams have priced themselves out of the bidding- though THT’s Dave Studeman recently pointed out that the decrease in inflation has historically never reached the level of deflation.

The relevant conclusion is that a long contract only takes perceptual advantage of inflationary patterns if it spans an entire inflationary cycle. Even then, teams do not get additional value out of the player, the player simply looks cheaper relative to the rest of the league. Nothing has changed the risk of catastrophic injury or rapid decline that made the generation-long contract undesirable in the first place. Therefore, even though I understand the reasoning of behind lengthening contracts for top flight free agents, and it seems that the GMs offering them have real plans, I still believe that these teams are taking on an unjustifiable amount of risk.