The Opposite Way

By this point, just about everyone understands the effect that a stadium can have on a hitter’s statistics. A related concept that receives slightly less attention is the effect that a stadium can have on a hitter’s approach at the plate. For instance, a lefty power hitter in Yankee Stadium will go to great lengths to pull the ball at every opportunity, looking for inside pitches and possibly forgoing the opportunity to go the other way. On the other hand, look at the career arc of David Ortiz, who started hitting the ball the opposite way when he reached Fenway in order to utilize the Monster. Ortiz previously struggled to go the other way, creating a hole in his swing that pitchers exploited.

The San Diego Padres have benefited tremendously from one such development. A few years ago, it looked as if former number one pick Adrian Gonzalez had joined the ranks of busted prospects who were once considered “can’t miss” types. A couple of uninspired seasons in Texas saw him hit for low average, fail to draw walks, and hit for too little power for a first baseman. His cat-like speed and reflexes translated into positive contributions in the field, but his batting line was miserable enough that he could not survive at shortstop. Even his 2004 AAA line in hitter-friendly Oklahoma City would not cut it in the bigs, because a .457 SLG for a first baseman only works if you draw enough walks to keep your OBP at or above .400. Despite a solid minor league stint in 2005, the Rangers sent him packing before the 2006 season as something of an afterthought in the Adam Eaton and Akinori Otsuka for Chris Young trade. Solid as Otsuka has been, Eaton’s injuries, taken alongside the success of Young and Gonzalez have made the trade a slam dunk success for Kevin Towers and the Padres, playing a very sizable role in getting them into the postseason in 2006 and keeping them on the radar in a stronger NL West this year.

The transformation of Gonzalez came almost immediately after arriving in San Diego, a very perplexing development considering the fact that PETCO Park is an albatross for most left-handed power hitters. Players like Brian Giles and Ryan Klesko openly complained about the homer-sapping effects of their home field after moving into the new digs a few years ago, and the Padres have essentially given up on acquiring top-flight lefty hitting talent since that time.

Looking at the dimensions of the park, it is no surprise that southpaws would struggle to hit many homeruns. After all, power alleys are the foremost indicators of a stadium’s run environment, and PETCO does a number on anyone trying to pull the ball to right field. Even though the center field fence is only 396 feet away from home plate, the fence actually gets further away in the power alleys, peaking at 411 feet in the right-center power alley, a spot where many lefty power hitters pile up their extra base hits. At 378 in right field, the conventional pull does not get much more help. A right field corner that runs perpendicular to home plate makes the fair pole look like a more forgiving 322 feet, although the angle makes it extremely difficult to hit a fair ball over that fence. Compare these dimensions to left field, where the power alley tops out at 402 feet, quickly juts in to 367 feet, then tapers off to 334 down the line in a much more standard formation. Right-handed hitters have it tough enough in the stadium; lefties have it nearly impossible.

So how has Gonzalez managed to blossom into a star player pushing a 900 OPS in one of the least favorable hitting environments for his skill set in all of baseball? Just as I mentioned in the intro, Gonzalez has made a career-altering adjustment. His numbers saw a small dip at home, going from a strong .311/.378/.527 on the road to a more paltry .296/.344/.471 at home. The second line would not survive at first base in a neutral park, but considering that PETCO is anything but a neutral park begins to put his production into context.

Thanks to the wonderful Hit Chart feature at mlb.com, we can take that analysis a bit deeper. When reading the chart for Gonzalez, it is easy to see how he managed to work around the power-depressing dimensions of his home stadium. Whereas young ballplayers learn to hit for power by pulling the ball relentlessly, Gonzalez had to relearn the approach to go the other way, and he did so brilliantly. Of the 16 doubles he hit at PETCO last year, 2 of them snuck into that funny right field corner. The other 14 went to the opposite field. And I’m not talking about dead center or a mild pull; I mean that he hit all of these doubles into true left field, a majority of them directly down the line. Even the homeruns he hit at home were skewed to the left, as 5 of the 10 went to center or the opposite way. Compare those splits to the way he hit on the road, where 9 of his other 21 doubles went to the opposite field. Even though that percentage shows some residual effect of his adjustment, he clearly makes a point of going the opposite way when the stadium dictates it as a necessity.

This perverse development puts Gonzalez in a unique position for the rest of his career, since statistical projections typically do not account for a player making a radical adjustment to his style to accommodate a stadium. It begs the question of what would happen to Gonzalez in a different hitting environment, although his road statistics seem to indicate that he knows what he’s doing there, as well. Ultimately, I do not believe that any projection system can fully account for the way Gonzalez has made the most of a difficult situation, nor do I think they can pick up on how intelligent of a player this adjustment indicates that he is. For both of these reasons, I expect him to play above the projection levels for several seasons, especially considering that he is still only 25 years old and has plenty of room to grow. PECOTA sees 2006 as his career year, forecasting a drop from being a seven win player last year to hovering around five wins worth of value over each of the next four. Part of the problem with that progression is that it sees his success at home as a bit fluky and regresses heavily to the mean. In reality, Gonzalez got smart instead of getting lucky, and deserves credit for it. Don’t blame the projection systems- treating every improvement as a breakout season would lead to a proliferation of over-projections. On the other hand, there is the occasional David Ortiz who makes sudden and real improvements in his game that the system must chalk up to unaccounted variance. Just as Gonzalez has replicated his 2006 form so far in 2007 (.308/.359/.551), expect him to remain a cheaply-acquired franchise first baseman for several years to come.