Up for the Down Stroke

Everyone knows that players who hit line drives are generally better hitters. Line drives are harder to field, go for more hits, and generate less outs, making them more valuable to a team as a whole. As ground balls and fly balls go, fly balls are usually more offensively valuable because their upside is a homerun, whereas a groundball will seldom turn into anything better than a single. The relationship here harkens to the comparative value of on-base percentage and slugging average- the best thing a batter can do is to not make an out; after that, the more bases the better. Thus, teams that hit more balls in the air should be the best offensive teams, right?

Look at the AL GB/FB data for offenses, a few numbers stand out. The Red Sox are a low outlier, hitting .95 ground balls for every fly ball, whereas 11 of the 13 other teams fall between 1.13 and 1.28. Their offense is very successful, scoring the 5^th most runs in the league, continuing a trend of strong offenses in a very hitter friendly park. Indeed, I believe the fly ball-heavy offense in Beantown is entirely by design: Theo Epstein and his extremely create brain trust know that the team will play 81 games a year with a very short porch. Manny Ramirez and David Ortiz already fit the profile of power hitters who frequently put the ball in the air, and the players added to the roster since the World Series victory further reinforce the fly ball first hypothesis. Check out these players with relatively low career GB/FB numbers who have recently joined the lineup:

Mark Loretta: 1.16

Eric Hinske: 1.01

Wily Mo Pena: 1.32 (1.00 in Boston)

Mike Lowell: 0.68 (!)

Kevin Youkilis: 0.70 (!)

Coco Crisp: 1.39

See a trend here? Mostly right-handed, mostly fly ball hitters, clearly with an eye to the Green Monster. Hinske is left-handed, and Crisp was supposed to be a defensive specialist, but the rest of the group creates loads metallic thuds off of the Monster. Loretta’s year is particularly instructive of this bit of strategy. Before the season, Kevin Towers explained that he unloaded Loretta for Doug Mirabelli because Loretta had lost enough bat speed to age that he could no longer get the ball out of the park. In giant Petco Park, medium-length fly balls would not play for a hitter who hits bunches of flies. In Fenway, on the other hand, those medium-length fly balls could become long singles and doubles instead of outs. The result? 30 doubles this year to 16 last year. He still is not hitting home runs (4 instead of 3), but the extra 20 points of slugging are worth something. And the funny thing is, Kevin Towers was probably right: Loretta would most likely have been abysmal in San Diego this season. The 35-year old’s decline phase was fully in swing last year, and for him to actually gain back a little bit of OPS is a pretty remarkable instance of putting a player in the right conditions. It would be easy to dismiss his season as one big park effect, and not a reflection of Boston’s planning. Ultimately, the improvement is due to a park effect, but only because the team lined up its situation with a player whose skills fit it like a glove.

Understanding the context of ground ball and fly ball data is crucial. Chicago and Texas follow Boston in AL in terms of hitting the ball in the air. Both teams have good offenses, and both teams have parks that reward hitters who put the ball in the air. Adding guys like Carlos Lee and Jim Thome fit the profile perfectly, so it is no surprise that both teams are able to score runs.

It would stand to reason, then, that the other end of the spectrum would exhibit some of the worst offenses. So it comes as no surprise to see Kansas City leading the AL and Chicago leading the NL in GB/FB ratio, mirroring offenses that are inept on the whole. Oddly, though, the other high outlier in the AL is the Minnesota Twins, a team that has surprisingly scored the sixth most runs in the league. Sure, even though Justin Morneau hits for power, the Twins are not built on a foundation of bombers like the Red Sox or White Sox. They find their runs in different ways. But if hitting the ball in the air creates runs by preventing outs, then how can a team that hits three ground balls for every two fly balls have a successful offense?

I think it would be helpful to consider how the Twins offense functions by design. Terry Ryan has essential built the lineup that Billy Beane has been trying to design for the last couple of years: the Twins almost never strike out, and draw a pretty average number of walks. Tautologically, that means the avoid striking out by avoiding third strikes, which probably means they choke up, go to the opposite field more frequently, and stop trying to hit homeruns. Just like baseball before Babe Ruth, this approach means less strikeouts, less homeruns, more balls in play, and, apparently, more groundballs (since most players cannot pull the ball in the air as frequently with a shortened swing). For most of baseball history, this strategy has proven less effective for scoring runs than trying to get on base and hit for power, a la Earl Weaver or the aforementioned Red Sox.

The one notable and extended exception to the strategic evolution away from hitting the ball on the ground came in the late 1970s and 1980s, when players like Vince Coleman and Willie McGee not only found jobs, but won awards. What was different in that era? Obviously, the playing surface. Playing on turf radically changes the game by allowing high-bouncing infield singles, more difficult infield defense- which was clearly at play for Luis Castillo during his adjustment to the Dome early in the year- and some would-be singles to shoot the gaps, generating extra base hits for fast players. Yes, the Twins have more groundball outs. Yes, they hit into a distressingly high number of double plays (3 off the league lead). They also shoot gaps for extra base hits, and run aggressively, creating runs by the Whitey Herzog model. Having studs like Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau makes a big difference, but a team with limited resources has to find value at the margins, and the Twins have plugged in players who maximize the value of a funny playing surface by putting the ball into play and using their speed. Just as Loretta may struggle for another team in another stadium, this “piranhas” business would not fly in a place like Oakland that punishes ground balls and foul balls.

You know the saying, “different strokes for different folks.” Well, in baseball, it is not quite so egalitarian. Certainly, different playing contexts privilege different types of players, so smart general managers find marginal talent that fits into that context. What works in Minnesota may not work for Kansas City, a grass-surface team with ground ball tendencies. Really, avoiding outs is the name of the game, and it is a general manager’s job to exploit any advantage that the home field provides in terms of offensive strategy. Not surprisingly, the best GMs are the ones who have the most nuanced offenses, and the ones who win the most games.